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Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual Connection 
Charles R. T. O’Kelley† 
Accepting the institution of the large corporation (as we must), and 
studying it as a human institution, we have to consider the effect on 
property, the effect on workers, and the effect upon individuals who 
consume or use the goods or service which the corporation produces 
or renders. This is the work of a lifetime . . . .1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Great men have two lives,” Adolf Berle once observed, “one 
which occurs while they work on this earth; a second which begins at the 
day of their death and continues as long as their ideas and conceptions 
remain powerful.”2 As the contributions to the first and second annual 
Berle symposia attest, Berle’s ideas and conceptions remain powerful, 
and there is keen interest in placing his thoughts in their proper historical 
context.3 Berle continues to be the dominant intellectual force undergird-
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 1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, at viii (1932). 
 2. Adolf Berle, Speech at the Ceremony of Homage to President Roosevelt, Itamaraty, Brazil 
(May 12, 1945), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS: 1918–1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 
535 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973); see also Foreword, Beatrice Berle 
Meyerson, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 993 (2011). 
 3. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist 
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008) [hereinafter Bratton & 
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
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sessing the Implications of Berle’s Public Consensus Theory, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1109 (2010); 
Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141 (2010); Fenner L. 
Stewart, Jr., Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective for Reconsidera-
tion During the Rise of Finance, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1457 (2011); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism 
to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 179 (2005). 
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ing our understanding of modern corporate law; in his “second life,” he 
continues to animate discourse about needed financial market reforms 
and regulation of the continuously evolving corporate system. 
For my contribution to Berle II, I have chosen to highlight the need 
for further research into the connection between The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property4 (Modern Corporation) and the work of Thors-
tein Veblen, the father and intellectual inspiration of institutional eco-
nomics.5 While the connection between Veblen and Modern Corporation 
is indisputable, the meaning of that connection has not been explored in 
any depth. I will provide a framework for thinking about the nature of 
Veblen’s influence on Modern Corporation and suggest that further re-
search on Veblen’s influence would be most fruitful. I will then provide 
an initial account of how Veblen’s work may help us understand what 
Berle intended to convey in Modern Corporation. 
Veblen’s pathbreaking approach to economics first received promi-
nent attention in 1899 with the publication of The Theory of the Leisure 
Class.6 For the next twenty-five years, Veblen’s books, articles, essays, 
and book reviews7 laid out his continuously evolving critique of the insti-
tutions of modern capitalism and his evolutionary institutionalist ap-
proach to economics, culminating with the publication in 1923 of Absen-
tee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times 8  (Absentee 
Ownership). During this period, Veblen was one of America’s most in-
fluential public intellectuals, and his ideas remained central in the minds 
of leading jurists, lawmakers, and other public intellectuals in the early 
years of the New Deal.9 His strongest influence, of course, was felt in the 
world of economics. 
Writing at the beginning of the New Deal, one observer noted: 
                                                            
 4. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 5. On Veblen’s influence among institutional economists and related scholars, see Malcolm 
Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 174–76 (2001) [herei-
nafter Rutherford, Institutional Economics]; Malcolm Rutherford, Institutionalism Between the 
Wars, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 291, 292–94 (2000) [hereinafter Rutherford, Institutionalism Between the 
Wars]. 
 6 . THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF 
INSTITUTIONS (1899). 
 7. For a bibliography of Veblen’s work, see JOSEPH DORFMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND 
HIS AMERICA, 519–24 (1934). For a summary analysis of Veblen’s less well-known essays and book 
reviews, see Donald A. Walker, New Light on Veblen’s Work and Influence, 37 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 
87, 87–93 (1978). 
 8. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: 
THE CASE OF AMERICA (A.M. Kelley 1964) (1923). 
 9. For a summary introduction to Veblen’s broad influence, see Walker, supra note 7, at 93–
101. 
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No small part of the recent discussion in economics in this country 
centers in the controversy between the “institutional” and the “or-
thodox” schools of theory. The debate in this connection has gone 
on almost incessantly, and sometimes at a high heat, for some thirty 
years, and it has attracted so much interest that the American Eco-
nomic Association has found it worth while on several occasions to 
provide a round-table for the pursuance of the argument.10 
As to the nature of the dispute, the same observer noted: 
It is generally recognized, of course, that the broad question is one 
of the method and scope of economic analysis, and that the choice 
to be made is between following in the tradition of Alfred Marshall 
and taking the standpoint of Thorstein Veblen.11 
At the eve of the New Deal, Alfred Marshall was the acknowledged 
intellectual giant of orthodox economics. 12  The orthodox school of 
thought that Marshall’s name evoked was well understood and devel-
oped. Ironically, the name it bore—neoclassical economics—was coined 
by Thorstein Veblen.13 In contrast to neoclassical economics, institution-
al economics was a much looser confederation of scholars for whom 
Veblen’s voluminous body of work provided a guiding inspiration.14 
As Malcolm Rutherford has documented, by the eve of the New 
Deal, institutional economists and legal realists dominated Columbia 
University. Berle joined the law faculty at Columbia in 1927 and was a 
member of that vibrant intellectual community.15 Modern Corporation 
                                                            
 10. Karl L. Anderson, The Unity of Veblen’s Theoretical System, 47 Q. J. ECON. 598, 598 
(1933). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Paul A. Samuelson, Economists and the History of Ideas, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (1962) 
(“Back in 1935, Marshall was still propped up on his throne and in large parts of the world even the 
zealots of the mathematical method tended to look upon Walras merely as the predecessor to the 
great Pareto.”); R. W. Souter, “The Nature and Significance of Economic Science” in Recent Dis-
cussion, 47 Q. J. ECON. 377, 378 (1933) (“[T]he genuine Classical Tradition . . . has so far reached 
its highest integration in the work of Marshall.”). 
 13. For Veblen’s first published usage of the term, see Thorstein Veblen, The Preconceptions 
of Economic Science, 14 Q. J. ECON. 240, 261, 265, 268 (1900); for discussion, see Tony Aspro-
mourgos, On the Origins of the Term ‘Neoclassical,’ 10 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 265 (1986). 
 14. See Anderson, supra note 10. 
 15. Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics at Columbia University, 36 HIST. POL. ECON. 
31, 31–33, 44–59 (2004). The structure at Columbia University facilitated interaction among like-
minded social scientists: 
Between 1913 and the early 1930s Columbia became the academic home of a particularly 
large concentration of economists of institutionalist leaning. These include Wesley Mit-
chell, J. M. Clark, Fredrick C. Mills, Paul Brissenden, James Bonbright, Robert Hale, Jo-
seph Dorfman, Carter Goodrich, Rexford Tugwell, Gardiner Means, Leo Wolman, Ho-
race Taylor, A. F. Burns, and, later on, Karl Polanyi. Perhaps A. R. Burns and Eveline 
Burns should also be included as being, at the least, sympathetic to institutionalist ideas. 
Furthermore, over the period in question, the Department of Economics was a graduate 
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was certainly viewed by that community as, in part, a work of institu-
tional economics, and thus, as a work following in Veblen’s general 
footsteps. But it was also viewed as an extension of Veblen’s last com-
prehensive analysis of American capitalism—Absentee Ownership.16 
Berle17 directly signaled these connections to Veblen at the begin-
ning of Modern Corporation. In the book’s very first paragraph, Berle 
pronounces the book’s central theme and clearly indicates that his study 
of the emerging corporate system is a work in the institutional economics 
genre: 
The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property te-
nure and a means of organizing economic life. Grown to tremend-
ous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a “corporate sys-
tem”—as there was once a feudal system—which has attracted to it-
self a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a de-
gree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major social in-
stitution.18 
In the book’s second paragraph, Berle cites Veblen’s last book, Absentee 
Ownership (1923).19 Veblen is the first scholar cited by Berle and one of 
only three scholars cited in the first and last four chapters of Modern 
Corporation, the book’s theoretical core.20 
Thus, we can be certain that Modern Corporation was intended by 
Berle and understood by his Columbia colleagues to be a work in the 
Veblenian tradition. But we can be less certain about what Berle and his 
contemporaries understood that tradition to entail; unlike the neoclassical 
school, Veblen’s contributions had not been systematized. 
                                                                                                                                     
department offering degrees within the Faculty of Political Science. The Faculty also 
contained the graduate departments of sociology, history, and public law. Karl Llewellyn 
and Adolf A. Berle were members of the Department of Public Law and the Law School. 
Robert Hale moved from economics to the Law School, and Gardiner Means was a 
member of the economic research staff of the Law School between 1927 and 1933, and 
was an associate in law from 1933 to 1935. From 1919 to 1927 the sociology department 
included William Ogburn. . . . Outside of the Faculty of Political Science, the philosophy 
department contained John Dewey, whose instrumentalist philosophy was widely influen-
tial and closely connected to institutional economics. 
Id. at 32. 
 16. Rutherford, Institutional Economics, supra note 5, at 181. 
 17. Although Gardiner Means contributed economic analysis, the project that gave rise to 
Modern Corporation and the major ideas and writing were Berle’s. See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, 
LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 58–59 (1987). 
 18. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 1. 
 19. Id. at 2. 
 20. For analysis of Berle’s citations in the first and last four chapters of Modern Corporation, 
see O’Kelley, supra note 3, at nn.66–83 and accompanying text. 
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[Although] the Marshallian type of theory has been amply ex-
pounded, defended and elaborated, so that every economist can 
know what it stands for, the Veblenian type of theory remains 
something of a mystery. It is no compliment to the institutional 
economists that as a rule they have not taken the trouble to attempt a 
consistent statement of the doctrines of Veblen, nor even to set forth 
clearly the points upon which they agree with him.21 
This Essay is not the place to attempt a heroic reconstruction of 
what Berle and his contemporaries understood Veblen’s philosophy to be 
at the writing of Modern Corporation, and were it the place, I am not the 
engineer to undertake that task. Instead, I will draw from Veblen’s own 
writings to provide a sketch of his life’s work. I quote long passages 
from his work with the intention of providing an access point for readers 
unfamiliar with it. Then, I place Modern Corporation in the context of 
Veblen’s work. In so doing, I will suggest that Modern Corporation 
should be considered a work of evolutionary economic science as Veblen 
used that term. Part II of this Essay details Veblen’s vision of modern 
economics as an evolutionary science. Part III highlights Veblen’s twen-
ty-five year attempt to create an evolutionary economic account of 
American capitalism, with particular emphasis on Veblen’s seminal in-
sights concerning the modern corporation and separation of ownership 
and control. Part IV visits Modern Corporation’s account of separation 
of ownership and control and interprets that account in light of Veblen’s 
body of work. 
II. VEBLEN AND THE EVOLUTIONARY GROUNDING OF  
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
Writing at the close of the nineteenth century, Thorstein Veblen 
posed a question in the title of his seminal article, Why is Economics not 
an Evolutionary Science?22 In posing and answering this question, Veb-
len provided the grounding inspiration for what would later become 
known as Institutional Economics.23 Veblen also effectively outlined the 
project that would consume the remainder of his working life—studying 
the American economic system from an evolutionary scientific perspec-
tive.24 
                                                            
 21. Anderson, supra note 10, at 598–99. 
 22. Thorstein Veblen, Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q. J. ECON. 373 
(1898). 
 23. The label “institutional economics” is said to have come into usage between 1916 and 
1918. See Rutherford, Institutionalism Between the Wars, supra note 5, at 292. 
 24. Veblen supplemented his analysis in Evolutionary Science with two contemporaneously 
written articles: The Instinct of Workmanship and the Irksomeness of Labor, 4 AM. J. SOC. 187 
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At the beginning of his seminal paper, Veblen provocatively stated: 
[I]t may be taken as the consensus of those men who are doing the 
serious work of modern anthropology, ethnology, and psychology, 
as well as those in the biological sciences proper, that economics is 
helplessly behind the times, and unable to handle its subject-matter 
in a way to entitle it to standing as a modern science.25 
As Veblen would explain, to become “modern,” economics would need 
to become an evolutionary science. 
A. Neoclassical Economics 
Initially, Veblen distinguished between neoclassical economics, 
which he identified with the work of Alfred Marshall and his followers, 
and the Austrian school, which he indentified with Menger, Jevons, and 
related scholars. Economists in both schools were devotees of marginal 
utility analysis, and Veblen saw little practical difference between the 
two schools.26 By the 1930s, Veblen’s term—neoclassical economics—
had come to denote the field of economics identified broadly with wealth 
or utility maximization and marginal utility analysis, a usage that contin-
ues to this day.27 
Veblen saw in the work of Alfred Marshall, and other scholars 
working in the classical tradition, an aspiration to make economics a 
modern, evolutionary science. But the work they produced remained 
fundamentally pre-evolutionary.28 
[T]he work of the neoclassical economics might be compared, 
probably without offending any of its adepts, with that of the early 
generation of Darwinians . . . . Economists of the present day are 
commonly evolutionists, in a general way. They commonly accept, 
as other men do, the general results of the evolutionary speculation 
in those directions in which the evolutionary method has made its 
way. But the habit of handling by evolutionist methods the facts 
with which their own science is concerned has made its way among 
the economists to but a very uncertain degree.29 
                                                                                                                                     
(1898), and The Preconceptions of Economic Science, published in 3 parts—Part I, 13 Q. J. ECON. 
121 (1899); Part II, 13 Q. J. ECON. 396 (1899); and Part III, Veblen, supra note 13. 
 25. Veblen, supra note 22, at 373. 
 26. Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620, 621 (1909). 
 27. William A. Mackintosh, An Economist Looks at Economics: The Presidential Address 
Delivered at a Joint Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association and the Canadian His-
torical Association on May 25, 1937, 3 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 311, 314 (1937). 
 28. Veblen, supra note 13, at 265–66. 
 29. Id. 
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Veblen viewed the chasm separating neoclassical and evolutionary 
economics as “a difference of spiritual attitude or point of view . . . a dif-
ference in the basis of valuation of the facts for the scientific purpose.”30 
Neoclassical economics was teleological, and the economic theory it 
produced was “‘deductive’ or ‘a priori’ as it is often called—instead of 
being drawn in terms of cause and effect.”31 In contrast, “[t]he prime 
postulate of evolutionary science, the preconception constantly underly-
ing the inquiry, is the notion of a cumulative causal sequence.”32 
Neoclassical economics achieved its scientific, deductive results 
within a framework of assumptions about reality that removed all con-
siderations of evolutionary change and human action.33 The human actor 
is conceived in terms of “the traditional psychology of the early nine-
teenth-century hedonists.”34 He is farsighted and rational, concerned only 
with maximizing his pleasure and minimizing his pain.35 But he is not an 
actor in the sense of being a causative agent. He is a totally passive reac-
tor to what the environment presents—an automaton. 
The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of 
pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of 
desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about 
the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor conse-
quent. He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equili-
brium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace 
him in one direction or another. . . . When the force of the impact is 
spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before. 
Spiritually, the hedonistic man is not a prime mover. He is not the 
seat of a process of living, except in the sense that he is subject to a 
series of permutations enforced upon him by circumstances external 
and alien to him.36 
                                                            
 30. Veblen, supra note 22, at 377. 
 31. Veblen, supra note 26, at 625. 
 32. Veblen, supra note 13, at 266. 
 33. Thomas Sowell, The ‘Evolutionary’ Economics of Thorstein Veblen, 19 OXFORD ECON. 
PAPERS 177 (1967). According to Sowell: 
Had economics followed Veblen, it would have become a fundamentally different kind of 
inquiry. His sustained attacks on the “preconceptions of economic science” were not at-
tacks on the validity of particular doctrines but attacks on the general outlook which gave 
rise to such a line of (to him) meaningless inquiry into economic statics, while leaving the 
glaring fact of qualitative economic and social change largely unexplored. Veblen at-
tacked the questions of traditional economics rather than the answers. 
Id. at 180–81 (internal citation omitted). 
 34. Veblen, supra note 26, at 622. 
 35. Id. at 623. 
 36. Veblen, supra note 22, at 389–90. 
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Neoclassical economics imagines this rational man inhabiting a 
world in which the major economic institutions that affect life have been 
simplified to data points as lifeless and unchanging as man himself. 
Likewise, these key institutions, including the institution of private prop-
erty in the means of production, are conceived as preexisting, immutable 
features of society that need not and should not be studied or questioned. 
The cultural elements involved in the theoretical scheme, elements 
that are of the nature of institutions, human relations governed by 
use and wont in whatever kind and connection, are not subject to 
inquiry but are taken for granted as pre-existing in a finished, typi-
cal form and as making up a normal and definitive economic situa-
tion, under which and in terms of which human intercourse is nec-
essarily carried on. This cultural situation comprises a few large and 
simple articles of institutional furniture, together with their logical 
implications or corollaries; but it includes nothing of the conse-
quences or effects caused by these institutional elements. The cul-
tural elements so tacitly postulated as immutable conditions 
precedent to economic life are ownership and free contract, together 
with such other features of the scheme of natural rights as are im-
plied in the exercise of these. These cultural products are, for the 
purposes of the theory, conceived to be given a priori in unmitigated 
force. They are part of the nature of things; so that there is no need 
of accounting for them or inquiring into them, as to how they have 
come to be such as they are, or how and why they have changed and 
are changing, or what effect all this may have on the relations of 
men who live by or under this cultural situation.37 
In sum, Veblen saw neoclassical economics as a snapshot of eco-
nomic relations at a given moment in time, with permanence and immu-
tability attributed to that depicted. In contrast, an evolutionary science 
would inquire as to why the things depicted were as they were, and how 
circumstances were likely to change in the future. In other words, a mod-
ern science must be historical and predictive, based on an evolutionary 
and realistic understanding of human psychology and social institutions. 
Nothing is given or preordained, everything is contestable and con-
tested.38 
                                                            
 37. Veblen, supra note 26, at 623–24. 
 38. For analysis of Veblen’s theory of knowledge, see Helge Peukert, On the Origins of Mod-
ern Evolutionary Economics: The Veblen Legend after 100 Years, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 543 (2001). 
Peukert argues that Veblen’s epistemology is akin to that of Richard Rorty and other postmodernist 
thinkers: 
Veblen shared their critique of scientific foundationalism, the belief in an absolute be-
drock of truth in the Cartesian–Lockean–Kantian tradition. Veblen combined his decon-
structivism with an attitude of irony and pastiche, and sometimes melancholy, cynicism 
and despair. For Rorty and Jean-Francois Lyotard modernity was characterized by the 
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B. Economics as Evolutionary Science 
For evolutionary economics, the human actor is not a passive utility 
calculator, otherwise incidental to the processes of economic life, but is 
instead the central causative factor in economic activity.39 Man is an ac-
tor who always seeks to do something.40 “He is not simply a bundle of 
desires that are to be saturated by being placed in the path of the forces 
of the environment, but rather a coherent structure of propensities and 
habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity.”41 
The resulting human activity must be the central focus of modern eco-
nomic science. It cannot be presumed that such activity will be rational 
                                                                                                                                     
tendencies of commodification, mechanization, and technology (which—according to 
Veblen—led to the concept of cumulative causation). Postmodernity means the end of the 
secure positives, grand referents, and finalities (like Smith’s concept of a civil and com-
mercial society), an incredulity toward meta-narratives, and a hermeneutics of suspicion 
with reference to the matter-of-fact problem of meaninglessness. 
Id. at 550–51. For discussion of linkage between Veblen and Einstein, and their respective theories 
of knowledge, see William T. Ganley, A Note on the Intellectual Connection Between Albert Eins-
tein and Thorstein Veblen, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 245 (1997). Veblen and Einstein agreed on the fun-
damental nature of scientific theory: 
[Veblen believed] that in modern science the imputation of activity to the observed ob-
jects remained at the center of scientific theory. It was here that the minds of Einstein and 
Veblen met on the meaning of scientific theory: 
Activity continues to be imputed to the phenomena with which science deals; 
activity is, of course, not a fact of observation, but is imputed to the phenome-
na by the observer. 
Since Einstein’s physicist freely created the most significant concepts for theoretical 
physics, Veblenian analysis of science methodology was consistent with Einstein’s as-
sessment: 
physical concepts are free creations of human mind, and are not, however it 
may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. 
Id. at 248–49 (internal citations omitted). Einstein acknowledged his appreciation of Veblen’s work 
in connection with remarks he had been asked to make about Bertrand Russell: 
When the editor asked me to write something about Bertrand Russell, my admiration and 
respect for that author at once induced me to say yes. I owe innumerable happy hours to 
the reading of Russell’s works, something which I cannot say of any other contemporary 
scientific writer, with the exception of Thorstein Veblen. 
Id. at 245–46 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Albert Einstein, Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s 
Theory of Knowledge, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL (THE LIBRARY OF LIVING 
PHILOSOPHERS) (Paul A. Schilpp ed., 1944)). 
 39. See Ann Jennings & William Waller, Evolutionary Economics and Cultural Hermeneutics: 
Veblen, Cultural Relativism, and Blind Drift, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES 997 (1994). “The problems con-
fronting individuals and most of the tools for their solution are posed by current cultural relation-
ships, but some scope for novel individual responses to them must exist.” Id. at 1005. 
 40. See VEBLEN, supra note 6, at 15 (“As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent. He 
is, in his own apprehension, a centre of unfolding impulsive activity—‘teleological’ activity. He is 
an agent seeking in every act the accomplishment of some concrete, objective, impersonal end.”). 
 41. Veblen, supra note 22, at 390. 
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or guided by a narrow focus on utility maximization.42 Rather, the rea-
sons for such activity are the proper focus of economic science.43 
Veblen sees human activity as an evolutionary process. What a man 
does today is a product of what Veblen calls his habits of thought or cir-
cumstances of temperament. 
[These habits of thought or circumstances of temperament] are ele-
ments of the existing frame of mind of the agent, and are the out-
come of his antecedents and his life up to the point at which he 
stands. They are the products of his hereditary traits and his past ex-
perience, cumulatively wrought out under a given body of tradi-
tions, conventionalities, and material circumstances; and they afford 
the point of departure for the next step in the process.44 
This process of cumulative change plays out as each individual adapts 
“means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the 
agent and his environment being at any point the outcome of the past 
process.”45 The environment consists of other persons with whom the 
agent relates, and social institutions that shape his state of mind and cir-
cumscribe his options. Ultimately, “economic change is a change in the 
economic community,—a change in the community’s methods of turning 
material things to account.”46 This “change is always in the last resort a 
change in the habits of thought.”47 
Only one vague presumption underlies an evolutionary econom-
ics—that man’s desire to act is at least partially directed towards achiev-
ing his “economic interest,” his “interest in the material means of life.”48 
But this end competes with numerous others, including the aesthetic, 
sexual, humanitarian, and devotional interests.49 And all human activity 
takes place adaptively and sequentially in concert and in reaction to the 
actions of others as shaped by the institutions of the day.50 
Thus, Veblen concluded a modern, evolutionary economics must 
focus on history, process, and change, and must seek “to trace the cumu-
lative working out of the economic interest in the cultural sequence.”51 
“It must be a theory of the economic life process of the race or the com-
                                                            
 42. John Wenzler, The Metaphysics of Business: Thorstein Veblen, 11 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE 
& SOC’Y 541, 548 (1998). 
 43. Veblen, supra note 22, at 390. 
 44. Id. at 390–91. 
 45. Id. at 391. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 393. 
 50. Id. at 392–93. 
 51. Id. at 394. 
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munity.”52 It must focus on “questions of genesis and cumulative change, 
and it [must converge] upon a theoretical formulation in the shape of a 
life history drawn in causal terms.”53 Though the focus is on human ac-
tion, it must not lose sight of the relation between human action, habits 
of thought, and social institutions. 
Like all human culture this material civilization is a scheme of insti-
tutions—institutional fabric and institutional growth. But institu-
tions are an outgrowth of habit. The growth of culture is a cumula-
tive sequence of habituation, and the ways and means of it are the 
habitual response of human nature to exigencies that vary inconti-
nently, cumulatively, but with something of a consistent sequence in 
the cumulative variations that so go forward—incontinently, be-
cause each new move creates a new situation which induces a fur-
ther new variation in the habitual manner of response; cumulatively, 
because each new situation is a variation of what has gone before it 
and embodies as causal factors all that has been effected by what 
went before; consistently, because the underlying traits of human 
nature (propensities, aptitudes, and what not) by force of which the 
response takes place, and on the ground of which the habituation 
takes effect, remain substantially unchanged.54 
Accordingly, “an evolutionary economics must be the theory of a process 
of cultural growth as determined by the economic interest, a theory of a 
cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in terms of the 
process itself.”55 
III. VEBLEN’S EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE EMERGING 
ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP SYSTEM 
A. Absentee Ownership—An Overview 
Beginning in 1898 and continuing for twenty-five years, Veblen 
wrote numerous books, articles, and reviews that developed his evolutio-
nary account of the emerging industrial system. The system continued to 
evolve as Veblen continued to study and write; Veblen’s theories 
evolved apace, culminating with the publication of Absentee Ownership 
in 1923.56 Veblen began his last great book by identifying the current 
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age’s most dominant institution—absentee ownership—and highlighting 
the role of absentee ownership in the organization of society. Veblen 
wrote: “In recent times absentee ownership has come to be the main and 
immediate controlling interest in the life of civilised men. It is the para-
mount issue between the civilised nations, and guides the conduct of 
their affairs at home and abroad.”57 
For the individual, achieving the status of absentee owner and the-
reby becoming a “substantial citizen” had become the social ideal. The 
motivating ideal was investment for profit: “[T]o get something for noth-
ing, to get legal possession of some source of income at a less cost than 
its capitalisable value.”58 
This development had happened gradually and over a course of 
years, but the reality of absentee ownership was now evident. 
[Absentee ownership] has now plainly come to be the prime institu-
tional factor that underlies and governs the established order of so-
ciety. At the same time and in the same degree it has, as a matter of 
course, become the chief concern of the constituted authorities in all 
the civilised nations to safeguard the security and gainfulness of ab-
sentee ownership.59 
Though the controlling interest in the life of civilized men had 
changed, the habits of thinking had not. Men continued to experience and 
justify economic and social relations and realities with concepts and be-
liefs suited for an earlier time. 
These matters are still spoken of in terms handed down from the 
past, and law and custom still run in terms that are fit to describe a 
past situation and conform to the logic of a bygone alignment of 
forces. As always, the language employed and the principles acted 
on lag behind the facts.60 
Veblen asserted that this lag between older institutions and changed re-
ality could not continue indefinitely. 
[U]nder the urgent pressure of new material conditions some degree 
of adjustment or derangement of these ancient principles is due to 
follow. . . . Continued irritation and defeat begot of a system of law 
and custom that no longer fits the material conditions of life will 
necessarily be an agency of unrest . . . . 
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Therefore, these time-worn principles of ownership and control, 
which are now coming to a head in a system of absentee ownership 
and control, are beginning to come in for an uneasy and reluctant 
reconsideration; particularly at the hands of the underlying popula-
tion who have no absentee ownership to safeguard.61 
Veblen was not content with merely describing the current govern-
ing institutions. He was constructing an evolutionary economics. Thus, 
he sought to explain how the prevailing habits of thought and governing 
institutions came to be and the material conditions of life with which 
they were consonant. He sought to explain how and why those material 
conditions of life had come to be out of balance with the prevailing ha-
bits of thought. In other words, he endeavored to explain how the system 
of ownership and control originally developed, and how it became trans-
formed into a system of absentee ownership and control. To explain, 
Veblen first brought into play another major social institution—the na-
tion-state. He saw two competing systems evolving in overlapping and 
supporting ways. He called these the system of national integrity and the 
system of natural rights.62 Subsequently, he introduced other major social 
institutions that played major roles in the creation of the world of the 
1920s: chief among these were the handicraft industry, the Masterless 
Man, the Captain of Industry, and the Corporation. 
B. Nationalism: The System of National Integrity 
Veblen’s brilliant analysis of the system of national integrity shows 
the linkage between the habits of mind that sustained the nation-state, 
and the later evolution of the business corporation and the system of ab-
sentee ownership. In essence, nation-states were and are corporations, 
and like absentee owners, their goal was and is to obtain unearned in-
come. The process of state-making during the Middle Ages and after-
wards gave rise to the spirit or habit of national integrity. 
State-making was a competitive enterprise of war and politics, in 
which the rival princely or dynastic establishments, all and several, 
each sought its own advantage at the cost of any whom it might 
concern. Being essentially a predatory enterprise, its ways and 
means were fraud and force. The several princely and dynastic es-
tablishments took on a corporate existence, with a corporate inter-
est, policy and organisation; and each of them worked consistently 
at cross purposes with all other similar corporations engaged in the 
same line of adventure. Among them were also principalities of the 
Faith, including the Holy See. The aim of it all centered in princely 
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dominion and prestige, and in unearned incomes for the civil, mili-
tary, and ecclesiastical personnel by whose concerted efforts the 
traffic in state-making was carried on.63 
These dynastic corporations carried out their adventures at the cost 
of their underlying populations. It was in the nature of a zero-sum game, 
but the losers in life and property were always the same. As these adven-
tures continued, each prince sought unbending control and a total usu-
fruct over his underlying population.64 In turn, the underlying population 
came to see their subservience as part of the natural order. 
In time, and indeed in a relatively short time, by force of strict and 
unremitting discipline and indoctrination the underlying population 
learned to believe that this princely usufruct of their persons and 
property by Grace of God was indispensably right and good, in the 
nature of things. By law and custom the underlying population came 
to owe, and to own, an unbounded and unquestioning allegiance of 
service to the princely establishment in whose usufruct they are 
held. Therefore servile allegiance has become not only a point of 
law but also a point of morals and honor. Such is the force of use 
and wont.65 
The underlying populations’ identification with their princely mas-
ters went deeper. As the various dynastic corporations went about their 
business of seeking advantage by fraud and force, by war and warlike 
diplomacy, they were each “imbued with an all-pervading spirit of enmi-
ty and distrust, suitable to that enterprise in mutual damage and discom-
fort for which they were organized and equipped.”66 The underlying po-
pulace quickly came to adopt this mendacious and warlike spirit in the 
natural course of habituation: 
[The] spirit of dynastic statecraft spread down and outward by dif-
fusion, by precept and example, throughout the underlying popula-
tion until presently they were, all and several, bound together in the 
service of their predacious masters by an inveterate and unreflecting 
solidarity of national conceit, fear, hate, contempt, and an enthusias-
tically slavish obedience to the constituted authorities.67 
In time, the monarchic nation-state gave way to the democratic na-
tion-state. The aims of the state and its relations to the underlying popu-
lation were unchanged by this transition. The divine right of the princely 
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sovereign became the divine right of the democratic state. In theory, each 
citizen in the democratic state was a sovereign, and the state was the ser-
vant of its collective citizens. In practice, the citizens continued to see 
themselves as bound together in service to the constituted authorities.68 
The monarchic state sought unearned income for its absentee own-
ers—the princely establishment and its kept class. The new democratic 
state continued in that role. The citizens of the new democratic state were 
led to believe that its constituted authorities sought to benefit all citizens 
and not just the rulers and the kept classes. Thus, as the democratic state 
continued to seek unearned income from rival nations through force or 
fraud, through war or sabotage, its loyal citizens were led to believe that 
they would all share in that income. In fact, the democratic state did not 
serve the broad underlying population. It continued to seek unearned in-
come for its administrative, military, and diplomatic personnel, but now 
its primary goal was to serve the business interests of the new class of 
absentee owners who arose, around 1850, with the full blooming of the 
industrial revolution.69 
C. Masterless Men, the Handicraft Industry, and the  
System of Natural Rights 
The Masterless Man is the central actor, and the handicraft industry 
is the central institution, in the creation of the modern democratic state 
and the transition from feudal habits of thought to the system of natural 
rights and ownership. Both arose gradually in the shadow of the long-
dominant feudal system and the habits of thought produced by and con-
ducive to the maintenance of that system. 
[T]he feudal (manorial) system, which was a settled order of mas-
tery and service, orderly, standardised, and stabilised as fully as 
might be, resting on a population engaged in mixed farming and 
bound to the soil. The law and custom of the feudal régime was a 
balanced scheme of coercion and submission, dependence and feal-
ty, in which all human values—rights and obligations, security of 
life and limb, equity and justice, neighborly respect and affection, 
religious profit and loss—were of right to be rated and apportioned 
according to a settled schedule of graded privilege, standardized su-
periority and inferiority. It was always and by settled principle a 
question of gradation in respect of mastery and service. In this 
scheme of human beings there was no place and no room for the 
masterless man.70 
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But Masterless Men there were—scattered outcasts, nuisances, and 
institutional misfits making a living with their hands, mixing their labor 
with readily available materials, and developing a craft. 
So, by drift of circumstance, these masterless men drew together to 
seek a livelihood by the work of their hands and without formal de-
pendence on the absentee rights and powers of those who owned the 
material world in that time. Out of the resulting scattered parcels of 
industrial drifters there grew up in course of time and experience the 
industrial towns and the arts, principles and mysteries of the handi-
craft industry.71 
As time wore on, these now-congregated Masterless Men devel-
oped new habits of thought congruent with the material conditions of 
masterless, ungraded life. They became accustomed to a life in which no 
absentee landlord had a claim on their product: it belonged to them and 
no one else. They came to place value on workmanship, not privilege. As 
Veblen noted, “Out of this workday experience appears to have arisen 
the common-sense notion that ownership is a ‘natural right’; in the sense 
that what a man has made, whatsoever ‘he hath mixed his labor with,’ 
that has thereby become his own, to do with it as he will.”72 
The craftsman’s ability to do as he would with the product of his 
hands gave rise to “a natural right of free bargain and contract in all that 
concerns his labor and its product.”73 This, in turn, gave rise to trade. As 
Veblen stated, “Trade—in this connection spoken of as the ‘Petty 
Trade’—is of the essence of the handicraft system of industry. The trade 
runs on this ‘natural right’ of free bargain, and comes in on an equal 
footing with workmanship as an inalienable right of the masterless 
man.”74Petty trade makes possible the simple division of labor envi-
sioned by Adam Smith. Each craftsman and trader is a solo producer. 
Each is engaged in workmanship and therefore morally “entitled to a li-
velihood on the ground of work done.”75 
D. The Rise of Absentee Ownership in Industry 
As the industrial revolution approached, the society of Masterless 
Men was undergoing an initially unnoticed and gradual change that, with 
the coming of the industrial revolution, sprang forth as a markedly dif-
ferent world. A minority of Masterless Men became absentee owners. A 
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majority of Masterless Men surrendered their ownership and control and 
became wage laborers.76 
This change first appeared in trade. The petty trader was engaged in 
small-time, barter-like dealings. “But the traffic presently grew greater in 
range, scale, and volume, and took on more of the character of ‘busi-
ness,’ in that the necessary management of contracts, bargaining, and 
accounts became an occupation distinct from the handling and care of the 
merchandise in transit and in the market-place.”77 Gradually, the petty 
trader became “an enterprising absentee investor who took care of the 
business; while agents, super-cargoes, factors took over the handling, 
carriage, and even the buying and selling of the goods, which so passed 
under the merchant’s ownership without passing under his hand.”78 The 
petty trader became a “merchant prince” and “the trade became a busi-
ness enterprise.”79 
A similar transition occurred with the craftsman, with “industry 
proper, in the shape of ownership of industrial equipment and materials 
and the employment of hired labor.”80 As with trade, the change was not 
obvious at first. The master generally remained on the grounds oversee-
ing the work.81 But with the coming of the industrial revolution, the 
change came to the fore. With the rapid increase in mechanization and 
the scale and scope of factory operations, capitalism arose. 
Instead of continuing to act as foreman of the shop, according to the 
ancient tradition, the owner began to withdraw more and more from 
personal contact and direction of the work in hand and to give his 
attention to the financial end of the enterprise and to control the 
work by taking care of the running balance of bargains involved in 
procuring labor and materials and disposing of the product. Instead 
of a master workman, he became a business man engaged in a quest 
of profits . . . . The result was that investment and absentee owner-
ship presently became the rule in the mechanical industries . . . .82 
. . . [F]rom this time on [the owner] became, in the typical case, 
an absentee manager with a funded interest in the works as a going 
business concern. The visible relation between the owner and the 
works shifted from a personal footing of workmanship to an imper-
sonal footing of absentee ownership resting on an investment of 
funds. Under the new dispensation the owner’s guiding interest cen-
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tered on the earnings of the concern rather than on the workmen and 
their work. The works—mill, factory, or whatever word may be pre-
ferred—became a business concern, a “going concern” which was 
valued and capitalised on its earning-capacity; and the businesslike 
management of industry, accordingly, centered upon the net earn-
ings to be derived in a competitive market,—earnings derived from 
the margin of the sale price of the product over the purchase price of 
the labor, materials, and equipment employed in its production.83 
The rise of absentee ownership coincided with the shift from simple 
division of labor to a world unfamiliar to Adam Smith. The rise of absen-
tee ownership marked the beginning of the end of the era of free compe-
tition. 
E. The Era of Free Competition 
The shift from the era of the Masterless Men to the era of the absen-
tee owner occurred over a brief period of time, roughly between 1775 
and 1850.84 That period of time was the true era of free competition. It 
was a time of rapidly increasing mechanization and large increases in 
production and material wealth. It was the time when the needs for capi-
tal first exceeded the capacity of the Masterless Men. Credit became an 
established factor in industrial business, and the businesslike manage-
ment of industry, focused as it was on net earnings, took into account a 
new objective: providing a reliable means of income for the creditor.85 It 
was during this era that “investment for a profit established itself in civi-
lised law and custom as the staple manner of ownership and control in 
industry.”86 
The era of free competition was not a period in which considera-
tions of business and finance conflicted with considerations of produc-
tion and workmanship. Markets were vast and untapped and could ab-
sorb as much as industry could produce.87 Until 1850 or so, the nature of 
industry was substantially unchanged from what had existed at the be-
ginning of the era of free competition: 
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Electricity, petroleum, and rubber had no share in industry then, and 
even that extensive use of structural iron and steel that has characte-
rised the later age was still in its beginnings. Industrial chemistry 
was but a slight and inconspicuous matter, and the industrial uses of 
the rarer metals were still unknown.88 
Gradually, the habits of thought from the handicraft era accommo-
dated these new relationships of ownership and control, and the gradual-
ism by which the nature of work changed facilitated that accommoda-
tion. The natural rights of ownership were seen as naturally attaching to 
the absentee owner even though his hands were not involved in work-
manship, just as the merchant prince was earlier accorded the moral 
rights of ownership.89 This accommodation was also facilitated by, and 
facilitated the rise of, a new institution: the Captain of Industry. 
F. The Captain of Industry 
The Captain of Industry is a mythological character—the entrepre-
neur, the spirit of the new industrial age in its period of free competition, 
and a bridge between the equally mythical Masterless Man and the ab-
sentee owner of the 1920s. But, like the Masterless Man, the Captain of 
Industry had his counterpart in reality. 
In the beginning the captain was an adventurer in industrial enter-
prise—hence the name given him; very much as the itinerant mer-
chant of the days of the petty trade had once been an adventurer in 
commerce. He was a person of insight—perhaps chiefly industrial 
insight—and of initiative and energy, who was able to see some-
thing of the industrial reach and drive of the new mechanical tech-
nology that was finding its way into the industries, and who went 
about to contrive ways and means of turning these technological re-
sources to new uses and a larger efficiency; always with a view to 
his own gain from turning out a more serviceable product with 
greater expedition. He was a captain of workmanship at the same 
time that he was a business man; but he was a good deal of a pio-
neer in both respects, inasmuch as he was on new ground in both re-
spects. In many of the industrial ventures into which his initiative 
led him, both the mechanical working and the financial sanity of the 
new ways and means were yet to be tried out, so that in both re-
spects he was working out an adventurous experiment rather than 
watchfully waiting for the turn of events. In the typical case, he was 
business manager of the venture as well as foreman of the works, 
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and not infrequently he was the designer and master-builder of the 
equipment, of which he was also the responsible owner.90 
Veblen acknowledges that even at the beginning of the era of free 
competition, many of the great fortunes were built not by persons fitting 
the archetype of the Captain, but instead by sharp practice and careful 
investment.91 Still, there was enough consonance between the myth and 
reality to shape a changed vision of what constituted morally praisewor-
thy activity and the highest form of ownership, enabling 
this type-form of the captain of industry to find lodgement in the 
popular belief; a man of workmanlike force and creative insight into 
the community’s needs, who stood out on a footing of self-help, 
took large chances for large ideals, and came in for his gains as a 
due reward for work well done in the service of the common good, 
in designing and working out a more effective organisation and in-
dustrial forces and in creating and testing out new and better 
processes of production.92 
This common belief became central to economic science as well, and the 
Captain of Industry was transformed “under the name of ‘Entrepreneur,’ 
as a fourth factor of production, along with Land, Labor and Capital.”93 
The habits of thought and beliefs engendered in the era of handi-
craft did not disappear with the coming or maturing of the mechanized 
industrial age. Instead, “[a]ccording to the moral bias created by age-long 
experience during the era of handicraft, men are still inclined to justify 
property rights on the ground of productive industry, serviceable work, 
rather than prescriptive tenure.”94 And, according to this habit of think-
ing, the Captain of Industry—the most productive of all citizens—is mo-
rally entitled to his profits. 
G. The Full Separation of Ownership and Industry 
The era of free competition initially featured the unification of 
ownership and industry that typified the handicraft era. The unification 
was beginning to unravel, but in the early years, it still served as a fair 
representation of reality.95 Consistent with that unity of ownership, 
industries were habitually conducted on a relatively small scale on a 
basis of self-ownership, with credit relations playing a subsidiary 
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and essentially transient part, and by owners who exercised a per-
sonal supervision of the works from day to day and dealt with their 
hired workmen on something of a personal footing.96 
The typical firm was owned and managed by a sole proprietor, or less 
commonly, by a small partnership.97 This unity of ownership and indus-
try was no longer a characteristic of industrial societies by the third quar-
ter of the nineteenth century. 
It is not possible to date the end of the era of free competition pre-
cisely, but somewhere around 1850, the first stage of the industrial revo-
lution ended and a new stage commenced. In a very short period of time, 
perhaps from 1850 to 1875, the material conditions of industry changed 
dramatically. At the beginning of this transition period, the mechanical 
processes and materials used in industry were little changed from those 
used in 1800. By 1875, however, electricity, petroleum, rubber, structural 
iron and steel, rarer metals, and new products from industrial chemistry 
were incorporated into the industrial system. “The industrial system, the 
state of the industrial arts, as it stood before that date was complete with-
out these things; since that time, since their invention has made them ne-
cessary, industry can not do without these things . . . .”98 
With this feverish creation and introduction of new inventions, the 
productivity of the industrial system surged dramatically. New plants and 
equipment were constructed. More products were produced. This created 
a rapid increase in demand for not only new raw materials, but the old 
staples as well, providing a flood of new unearned income and wealth to 
the absentee owners of these resources. It also created new demand for 
capital, which from the absentee owners’ perspective presented new op-
portunities to invest for profit. Much of this new investment took place in 
the form of credit, requiring the businessman to focus ever more atten-
tively on business affairs—on earning a profit for the benefit of the ab-
sentee owners. At the same time, the growing complexity of the industri-
al plant and processes gave rise to a new institution—the technician.99 
So the interval since the middle of the nineteenth century stands in 
contrast to what went before, as a more or less sharply defined pe-
riod of special growth in the industrial arts, during which the me-
chanical industry has progressively shifted to a footing of applied 
science, and during which also the immediate designing and con-
duct of the work has progressively been taken over by the techni-
cians. At the same time and by force of the same drift of circums-
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tance the captain of industry, the owner-employer, business manag-
er, has progressively been shifted to one side,—to the business side, 
the “financial end.” Being a layman in matters of industry—that is 
to say in matters of technically applied science—the business man 
has perforce become an absentee, an outsider so far as concerns any 
creative work.100 
While industry was now completely split away from the absentee 
owner in terms of technical control, he retained ultimate authority. He 
controlled the finances, decided the business strategy, and determined the 
relative emphasis given to production and salesmanship.101 The owner-
employer was now aligned with other absentee owners in the pursuit of 
net gain; in this pursuit, the owners were fundamentally at odds with the 
technicians and the underlying population.102 
H. The Corporation, the Principle of Net Gain, and the New Order 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the corporation had become 
“the master institution of civilised life,”103 and the dominant mechanism 
for financing industrial business enterprises.104 The corporation’s primary 
function was to facilitate absentee ownership. Its sole purpose was to 
make a profit for its absentee owners, and its only interest in its industrial 
properties and hired technicians was how to use them to make a profit.105 
The rise of the corporation coincided with the conditions attending the 
end of the era of free competition, and its ascendancy was accompanied 
by, and facilitated, the complete separation of ownership and industry. 
Further, corporation finance and the principle of net gain now worked in 
concert to prevent the effective use of the country’s industrial proper-
ties.106 
[T]he corporation is always a business concern, not an industrial 
appliance. It is a means of making money, not of making goods. 
The production of goods or services, wherever that sort of thing is 
included among the corporation’s affairs, is incidental to the making 
of money and is carried only so far as will yield the largest net gain 
in terms of money,—all according to the principal of “what the traf-
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fic will bear,” or of “balanced return,” which underlies all sound 
business, and more particularly all corporation business.107 
Net gain was the underlying principle of business, and all else, including 
production, yielded to its demands. 
This principle has come to be formally recognised and accepted as 
good and final ever since the corporation came into general use as 
the standard form of business concern. . . . [S]ince the dominant in-
terest of the civilised nations has shifted from production for a live-
lihood to investment for a profit . . . this principle of net gain has 
come to stand out naked and unashamed, as the sound and honest 
rule that should govern and limit the production of goods for human 
use. And the corporation incorporates this underlying principle of 
business enterprise more singly and adequately than any form of or-
ganisation that had gone before.108 
The hegemony of the corporation and the absentee owner coincided 
with the end of the era of free competition. During the period between 
1875 and 1900, oligopoly came to be the rule in several key industries. 
At the same time, the productivity of the industrial system came to great-
ly exceed what the market could bear at prices sufficiently profitable for 
the corporation to meet its obligations to absentee owners.109 Guided by 
the net gain principle, corporations relentlessly acted to maximize the 
value of corporate securities—values based on a capitalization of the 
corporation’s expected earnings. The period from 1900 to 1923 saw a 
steady increase in the overall wealth of the country.110 But absentee own-
ers of all stripes, particularly owners of corporate securities, reaped the 
gains. The underlying population fell behind. Men eager to work were 
unemployed; wages of labor were under constant attack. 
Most attributed the reduction in wealth to the underemployment of 
the nation’s industrial manpower and facilities. 111  But Veblen looked 
deeper to find the root cause—it was the principle of net gain combined 
with the absentee owners’ control of the nation’s industrial system. 
But capitalisation and earnings are a business proposition; 
livelyhood is not. And in any civilised country, like America, busi-
ness controls industry; which means that production must wait on 
earnings. Under these circumstances it is, as a matter of common 
honesty, incumbent on the business men in charge to keep this—in 
a sense fictitious—capitalisation intact, and to make it good by 
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bringing current earnings up to the mark. And they have been en-
deavoring to do this by curtailing employment and output to such a 
point that the resulting smaller volume of output at the resulting in-
creased price per unit will yield the requisite increased total price-
return. Among the expedients by which it is sought to save the capi-
talisation intact is a concerted effort to reduce wages.112 
And that sabotage of the industrial system in the pursuit of net gain was 
made possible, indeed made inevitable, by the habits of thought and sup-
porting laws that suited the era of the Masterless Man. While out of step 
with the material conditions of life in 1923, such habits of thought were 
shared by both the businessman and the underlying population.113 
It is not that these captains of Big Business whose duty it is to ad-
minister this salutary modicum of sabotage on production are 
naughty. It is not that they aim to shorten human life or augment 
human discomfort by contriving an increase of privation among 
their fellow men. Indeed, it is to be presumed that they are as hu-
mane as they profess. But only by shortening the supply of things 
needed and so increasing privation to a critical point can they suffi-
ciently increase their (nominal) earnings, and so come off with a 
clear conscience and justify the trust which their absentee owners 
have reposed in them. They are caught in the net of business-as-
usual, under circumstances which dictate a conscientious withdraw-
al of efficiency. The question is not whether the traffic in privation 
is humane, but whether it is sound business management; which re-
duces itself to a question of whether the underlying population will 
put up with a sufficient degree of privation for a sufficiently long 
time. And the underlying population of this country is notoriously 
tolerant as regards all those things that are done in the name of 
business.114 
But what did the future hold? What could be expected to occur in 
the next twenty years? Veblen, the evolutionary scientist who dedicated 
his productive life to developing a modern, predictive economics, was 
remarkably prescient. He saw four possibilities. One, the least likely 
even operating in the aftermath of Bolshevik Russia, was some form of 
revolt by the underlying population.115  The second possibility, which 
Veblen thought likely, was that the Federal Reserve Board and the major 
banks might work in concert to maintain a steadily increasing value for 
corporate securities, thereby minimizing corporations’ need to curtail 
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output and press downward on wages.116 A third possibility was a volun-
tary corporatist solution, in which key industries and the banks would 
“draw together on a concerted plan of common action and set the pace 
for the country’s industry as a whole by limiting output and service to 
such a rate and volume as will best serve their own collective net 
gain.”117 
The outcome Veblen thought most likely, however, was that corpo-
rations would continue to act within industry groups, with each group 
“seeking its own immediate advantage by charging what the traffic will 
bear, at the cost of any other vested interests and of the underlying popu-
lation.”118 Following this course would mean a continuation of periodic 
underproduction, underemployment, and attacks on wages—in the ser-
vice of absentee owners, corporations would continue “a haphazard and 
fluctuating sabotage on employment and output, after the pattern that had 
become familiar during the years before [World War I].”119 And in that 
course, Veblen had no doubt, lay disaster. 
In that strategy of businesslike curtailment of output, debilitation of 
industry, and capitalisation of overhead charges, which is entailed 
by the established system of ownership and bargaining, the consti-
tuted authorities in all the democratic nations may, therefore, be 
counted on to lend their unwavering support to all manoeuvres of 
business-as-usual, and to disallow any transgression of or departure 
from business principles. . . . The outlook should accordingly be 
that the businesslike control of the industrial system in de-
tail . . . should speedily pass beyond that critical point of chronic de-
rangement in the aggregate beyond which a continued pursuit of the 
same strategy on the same businesslike principles will result in a 
progressively widening margin of deficiency in the aggregate ma-
terial output and a progressive shrinkage of the available means of 
life.120 
And so it came to pass: six years later, scant weeks after Veblen’s death, 
the Great Depression struck. 
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IV. MODERN CORPORATION 
A. Modern Corporation as Veblenian Evolutionary Economic Theory 
The long-standing, standard account of Modern Corporation credits 
Berle as identifying in neoclassical economic terms the problem of sepa-
ration of ownership and control.121 But any comprehensive reading of 
Modern Corporation reveals an overwhelming similarity in style, theme, 
and methodology with the evolutionary institutional economics of Thors-
tein Veblen. Further, such reading makes clear that Berle was not inter-
ested in solving, or even presenting for solution, the problem of separa-
tion of ownership and control. His research showed that the modern cor-
poration had evolved into a social institution that could no longer be 
viewed as private property, nor could its owners, managers, or control-
lers claim the rights of the traditional sole proprietor modeled in neoclas-
sical economics. His focus was evolutionary, and the problems on which 
he focused were both understanding what the modern corporation had 
become and might become, and laying the groundwork for continuing 
study of the emerging corporation system. 
In the preface to Modern Corporation, Berle clearly reveals the in-
stitutional nature of the book’s underlying project. 
Accepting the institution of the large corporation (as we must), and 
studying it as a human institution, we have to consider the effect on 
property, the effect on workers, and the effect upon individuals who 
consume or use the goods or service which the corporation produces 
or renders. This is the work of a lifetime; the present volume is in-
tended primarily to break ground on the relation which corporations 
bear to property.122 
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The very first paragraph of Modern Corporation announces an evo-
lutionary economic research methodology and agenda: 
Corporations have ceased to be merely legal devices through which 
the private business transactions of individuals may be carried on. 
Though still much used for this purpose, the corporate form has ac-
quired a larger significance. The corporation has, in fact, become 
both a method of property tenure and a means of organizing eco-
nomic life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there may be said to 
have evolved a “corporate system”—as there was once a feudal sys-
tem—which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and 
powers, and has attained a degree of prominence entitling it to be 
dealt with as a major social institution.123 
The neoclassical approach treats the corporation as a nullity; there is no 
such thing as a corporation. The term “corporation” is simply a label we 
apply to the contractual relations between the participants in an incorpo-
rated business venture.124 Modern Corporation’s first paragraph clearly 
rejects that view. The modern corporation is more than a mere contrac-
tual device; it has become a system of property tenure. The remainder of 
the paragraph identifies an evolutionary economic project: the corpora-
tion system is a major social institution akin to the feudal system and 
should be studied as such. 
The second paragraph thematically amplifies the first and empha-
sizes Berle’s evolutionary economic focus: 
We are examining this institution probably before it has attained its 
zenith. Spectacular as its rise has been, every indication seems to be 
that the system will move forward to proportions which would stag-
ger imagination today; just as the corporate system of today was 
beyond the imagination of most statesmen and business men at the 
opening of the present century. Only by remembering that men still 
living can recall a time when the present situation was hardly 
dreamed of, can we enforce the conclusion that the new order may 
easily become completely dominant during the lifetime of our child-
ren. For that reason, if for no other, it is desirable to examine this 
system, bearing in mind that its impact on the life of the country and 
of every individual is certain to be great; it may even determine a 
large part of the behaviour of most men living under it.125 
Berle seeks to understand the corporation system as an evolving in-
stitution. He seeks to understand its genesis, and he understands that it 
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will evolve still further. Like Veblen, Berle understands that the corpora-
tion system likely will constitute a new order126 akin to feudalism in its 
effect on human behavior. 
The remainder of Modern Corporation’s introductory chapter and 
key parts of the remainder of the book are similarly Veblenesque. Like 
Veblen, Berle seeks to trace and contrast present-day law and ideology to 
earlier times.127 Like Veblen, he sees laissez-faire ideology as having 
developed as the material conditions of life evolved in ways fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the habits of thought and organizing institutions of 
the feudal system. Like Veblen, he sees the currently dominant laissez-
faire ideology as having arisen when feudalism and its ideologies no 
longer corresponded with the cultural situation.128 Like Veblen, Berle 
understands that laissez-faire ideology justified private property owner-
ship and pecuniary utility maximization—profit-seeking behavior—as 
socially beneficial and ordained to produce the best possible society.129 
Like Veblen, Berle sees the industrial revolution and the rise of the mod-
ern corporation as questioning the continued viability of the laissez-faire 
ideology.130 There are differences in the details of the theories presented 
by Veblen and Berle, but they are not differences in spiritual outlook. 
Berle sees the modern corporation and the corporation system through 
the same evolutionary lens as Veblen. 
B. Separation of Ownership and Control in Modern Corporation 
Berle, like Veblen, traces the development of the modern corpora-
tion from preindustrial times to the present. Veblen’s account ends with 
the world of 1923; Berle’s account ends with the world of 1932. Looking 
back to the world immediately before the industrial revolution, the time 
of Veblen’s Masterless Men, Berle identifies three functions of owner-
ship—the right to manage the work, the right to delegate the manage-
ment of the work, and the right to receive income or profits from the 
work. The preindustrial revolution owner normally carried out the work 
himself, so that the three functions of ownership were unified.131 With 
the industrial revolution, this normal unification of ownership came to an 
end. At some point during the nineteenth century, it became the norm for 
the owner to delegate management of the works to a hired manager, 
while retaining the right to receive profits. 
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Under such a system of production, the owners were distinguished 
primarily by the fact that they were in a position both to manage an 
enterprise or delegate its management and to receive any profits or 
benefits which might accrue. The managers on the other hand were 
distinguished primarily by the fact that they operated an enterprise, 
presumably in the interests of the owners.132 
This carving away of one of ownership’s three traditional func-
tions—the actual doing of the work—was what Veblen meant by separa-
tion of ownership and control. To avoid confusion, I will refer to this 
mid-nineteenth-century phenomenon as the separation of ownership and 
industrial management. So termed, both Berle and Veblen agree that at 
some point in the nineteenth century, ownership became divested of its 
industrial management function, leaving ownership with two functions: 
(1) the ultimate power to control the ends that industrial management 
must serve (the “control” function); and (2) the right to receive all profits 
produced by industry (the “investor” function). 
For Veblen, writing in 1923, separation of ownership and industrial 
management was the fundamental defining characteristic of the Ameri-
can economy. Ownership remained lodged in each corporation’s absen-
tee owners. He saw no conflict of interest between the absentee owners 
carrying out the control function and those carrying out the investor 
function. It is here that Veblen and Berle part company. 
Gardiner Means’s133 research revealed that of the 200 largest Amer-
ican corporations at the beginning of 1930, 5% were controlled by major-
ity stock ownership, and 6% were privately held. The remaining 89% 
were controlled by management (44%), a legal device (21%), or a minor-
ity shareholder group (23%).134 Based on these numbers, it was already 
the norm that control of America’s largest corporations was determined 
on a basis other than stock ownership. Further, Means’s research re-
vealed a continuing dispersion of stock ownership; accordingly, the per-
centage of firms in which control was not dependent on stock ownership 
would steadily increase. Thus, Berle and Means indentified a new arche-
typal corporation—the modern corporation—in which the power to elect 
the board of directors resided in the hands of a person or persons who 
owned substantially less than a majority of the corporation’s stock. 
Berle identifies the person or persons having the power to elect a 
majority of a modern corporation’s board of directors as the corpora-
                                                            
 132. Id. at 119 (emphases in original). 
 133. For Means’s role in Modern Corporation, see supra note 17. 
 134. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 94. 
1346 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1317 
tion’s “control.”135 The shareholders who are not part of control are rele-
gated to the investor function only. By definition, these investors consti-
tute a majority of the modern corporation’s stockholding body. Berle 
describes these majority shareholders as passive and geographically dis-
persed; we can think of them, institutionally and in the way described by 
Berle, as the “Dispersed Majority Shareholders.” As corporation law 
norms grant ultimate authority over the election of directors to the major-
ity shareholders, Berle views the Dispersed Majority Shareholders as the 
modern corporation’s owner. Separation of ownership from control, then, 
means that the Dispersed Majority Shareholders are excluded from con-
trol. 
Making this dichotomy work requires a nifty move. The person or 
persons carrying out the corporation’s control function are also share-
holders, and thus also seemingly carrying out the investor function. For 
Berle’s schema to pass muster, there must be some reason to believe that 
those in control will disregard their status as investor and act only in the 
interest of control. Berle solves this problem by identifying a fundamen-
tal divergence of interest between control and the Dispersed Majority 
Shareholders. 
The interests of each of the Dispersed Majority Shareholders 
seemed clear: 
In general, it is to his interest, first that the company should be made 
to earn the maximum profit compatible with a reasonable degree of 
risk; second, that as large a proportion of these profits should be dis-
tributed as the best interests of the business permit, and that nothing 
should happen to impair his right to receive his equitable share of 
those profits which are distributed; and finally, that his stock should 
remain freely marketable at a fair price.136 
Control would presumably share those interests if control owned all 
of the corporation’s stock. If such were the case, control would be moti-
vated by the desire to maximize personal profit as had been the tradition-
al owner. But can we assume that control will operate the modern corpo-
ration so as to maximize control’s personal profit? And if we do, will 
control’s interests diverge from that of the Dispersed Majority Share-
holders, the firm’s owners? 
If we are to assume that the desire for personal profit is the prime 
force motivating control, we must conclude that the interests of con-
trol are different from and often radically opposed to those of own-
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ership; that the owners most emphatically will not be served by a 
profit-seeking controlling group. In the operation of the corporation, 
the controlling group even if they own a large block of stock, can 
serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense of the 
company than by making profits for it. If such persons can make a 
profit of a million dollars from a sale of property to the corporation, 
they can afford to suffer a loss of $600,000 through the ownership 
of 60 per cent of the stock, since the transaction will still net them 
$400,000 and the remaining stockholders will shoulder the corres-
ponding loss. As their proportion of the holdings decrease, and both 
profits and losses of the company accrue less and less to them, the 
opportunities of profiting at the expense of the corporation appear 
more directly to their benefit. When their holdings amount to only 
such fractional per cents as the holdings of the management in man-
agement-controlled corporations, profits at the expense of the cor-
poration become practically clear gain to the persons in control and 
the interests of a profit-seeking control run directly counter to the 
interests of the owners.137 
Of course, control may be otherwise motivated—perhaps by the desire 
for power or prestige. Berle concludes, however, that even if this were 
so, the corporation would be operated counter to the owners’ interests.138 
Accordingly, persons in control, despite their ownership of shares, are 
not aligned in interest with the Dispersed Majority Shareholders. Owner-
ship and control are truly separated. 
C. Meshing Veblen and Modern Corporation 
It is easy to see how present-day readers would view Modern Cor-
poration’s description of the divergence of interests between control and 
owners as presenting a problem to be solved—a problem which present-
day neoclassical economists believe they have solved.139 And it is easy to 
see Berle and Means’s description of separation of ownership and control 
as at odds with Veblen’s analysis. But this was not Berle’s intent. 
Veblen had already powerfully critiqued and delegitimized the se-
paration of ownership from industrial management. His critique demon-
strated that control of the modern corporation had only a financial inter-
est in the underlying business. Control viewed the underlying business as 
an earnings stream to be maximized for the benefit of corporate security 
holders, the value of whose securities was based on a capitalization of 
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those earnings. Thus, control was motivated to keep wages low, and to 
allow factories to lie idle and workers to go unemployed when necessary 
to keep prices at the appropriate level. As Veblen put it, the law allowed 
control to sabotage its underlying industry, and control obliged when and 
as necessary to maximize the corporation’s net gain.140 
It is clear that Berle shared Veblen’s belief that control was respon-
sible for the periodic underutilization of factories and manpower.141 But 
Berle saw events since Veblen wrote in 1923 that enabled and called for 
a further attack on control. First, the makeup of shareholders had 
changed dramatically at the beginning of the 1920s, a fact probably too 
new to have been noticed by Veblen. Second, the great depression that 
Veblen predicted had in fact occurred. 
Gardiner Means’s research revealed that a dramatic decline in the 
proportion of corporate stock held by the wealthy occurred between 1916 
and 1921. The result was a shift from dominant ownership of corporate 
securities by the wealthy in 1916 to a drastic reduction in the percentage 
of such securities owned by the wealthy in 1921, with a corresponding 
increase in securities ownership by persons of moderate means.142 The 
1921 proportions had remained unchanged in the ensuing decade. 
Means’s research also showed that the portion of national savings going 
into corporate securities was steadily increasing: in 1922, 54.2% of prop-
erty income had come from investments in corporate securities; by 1927 
the percentage had increased to 62.8%.143 
Veblen had been correct in viewing the ownership of securities as 
principally an activity for absentee owners—the wealthy. But what Berle 
called “a change of almost revolutionary proportions” had occurred in a 
very brief period of time.144 The shareholders of the modern corporation 
now contained a large cadre of middle-class persons whose life savings 
were being drawn into the coffers of the modern corporation. 
The second change in material conditions that occurred since Veb-
len wrote Absentee Ownership was the great depression that Veblen had 
predicted. The Great Depression not only devastated workers through 
wage cuts and unemployment, it also savaged the value of corporate se-
curities. Persons of modest means who had invested their life savings in 
the stock market faced a radically altered future, but wealthy investors 
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were hard-hit as well. It seems likely that obtaining the status of absentee 
owner was no longer the prime objective for most citizens.145 
The dramatic effects of the stock market crash on both middle-class 
and wealthy shareholders supported Berle’s argument that shareholders 
not in control had more in common with each other, regardless of dispar-
ities in wealth, than they had in common with those in control of the 
modern corporation. Berle’s account accorded with a growing sentiment 
in society that those in control of the modern corporation were responsi-
ble for the Great Depression.146 His account supplemented Veblen’s mas-
terful critique by showing that control and the Dispersed Majority Share-
holders had abdicated the traditional roles of owner and manager, there-
by abdicating any claim that the modern corporation should be operated 
for their sole benefit.147 
Like Veblen, Berle saw the modern corporation producing net gain 
far in excess of what could be traced to the contributions or reasonable 
expectations of either control or the Dispersed Majority Shareholders.148 
Thus, the stage was set for “the community . . . to demand that the mod-
ern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all socie-
ty.”149 All that remained was for the community to approve and adopt “a 
program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable ser-
vice to their public, and stabilization of business, all of which would di-
vert a portion of the profits from the owners of passive property . . . .”150 
Not surprisingly, Berle’s account became the “bible” of the cadre of 
bright young men who moved to Washington with Franklin Roosevelt, 
intent on finding ways to bring control of the modern corporation under 
the control of the American people.151 
V. CONCLUSION 
Modern Corporation has captivated scholars in law and economics 
for nearly eighty years. But the context and spirit in which it was written 
has been largely ignored. In its time, it was understood as an extension of 
Thorstein Veblen’s Absentee Ownership and must have been understood 
by economics scholars as a work of evolutionary institutional economics. 
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I have attempted to place Modern Corporation in the context of both Ab-
sentee Ownership and the broader current of evolutionary economics, 
and have described how that context provides coherence to Berle’s ac-
count of the “problem” of separation of ownership and control. 
There is, of course, so much more that could and should be done to 
understand Veblen’s influence on Berle and others’ writing at the eve of 
the New Deal. In addition, two projects strike me as promising great re-
wards. First is research into the influence of Walther Rathenau on both 
Veblen and Berle. Both Veblen and Berle were sparse in their citations, 
yet both frequently cited Rathenau.152 The second is to trace the influence 
of Berle and Rathenau forward to the work of John Kenneth Galbraith. It 
is Galbraith, I suspect, who best understood the insights of Veblen and 
Berle and brought them to bear in his two greatest books—The Affluent 
Society (1958) and The New Industrial State (1967). I am sure there are 
numerous other projects that would and should complement these, and 
that would facilitate development of a comprehensive account of the 
modern corporation and the corporation system as they exist in our time. 
But these would be a good start. 
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